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Sogabe: Waiver of Counsel

NOTE
EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO SELFREPRESENTATION IN UNITED
STATES v. FARHAD: ISSUES IN
WAIVING A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law ... He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare for. his defense, even
though he have [sic] a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not·guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intelI
lect.
I. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the United States Supreme Court's recognition
of the right to waive counsel in Faretta v. California,2 the corollary right to self-representation has been a constant compo1

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (Opening quote written by Justice
Sutherland).
2

422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has an
absolute right to waive counsel, recognizing the right to self-representation. See id.

·129
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nent of the American criminal justice system. 3 In Farhad v.
United States,4 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's repeated statement of an unequivocal desire for selfrepresentation constitutes a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 6 Citing Faretta, the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal waiver of his right to self-representation. 6 However, the
Ninth Circuit ignored the more fundamental issue of whether
upholding defendant's right to self-representation resulted in
the denial of his right to a fair trial.
Though all U.S. courts recognize the right to selfrepresentation as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Faretta, constitutional and procedural issues affect its effective
implementation. This note explores the Sixth Amendment's
right to waive counsel and its effect on a criminal defendant's
Fifth Amendment right to receive a fair trial. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Farhad is critiqued on two issues: first, the
failure to address standby counsel in sharing duties of representation with the defendant;7 and second, the court's failure
to address Farhad's lack of access to the means of developing
his case. 8 Lastly, this note proposes the appointment of mandatory standby counsel for pro se defendants as a means of
protecting the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to
a fair trial while respecting the defendant's autonomy in the
criminal justice system.

3
4

6
6

7

See infra notes 51-157 and accompanying text.
190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
.

See ,d. at 1100.
See id.
.

See ,d. at 1099. In Farhad, the lower court refused defendant's request to share
duties with standby counsel. Rather, they provided him with the assistance of standby
counsel limited generally to providing guidance and answering defendant's questions
throughout the trial. See id.
8

See id. at 1099. The lower court also denied Farhad's repeated requests for access
to a legal library , investigator and witnesses. See id.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
While serving an unrelated sentence at San Quentin State
Penitentiary, Kashani Farhad filed 29 fraudulent tax returns
claiming refunds from 16 states. 9 Farhad collected approximately $20,000 using fictitious employers and social security
numbers. 10 Prison officials became suspicious of the volume of
mail from state tax bureaus and ultimately uncovered
Farhad's scheme. 11 Farhad was indicted on fourteen counts of
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,12 and five counts for
the fraudulent use of social security numbers in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).13

9 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098. Defendant developed a simple scheme of filing
fraudulent tax returns using his own name, prisoner ID number, and prison address.
See id.

10

.

See id. at 1098.
11See id.

12 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1999). "Frauds and sWindles"
.
.
proVIdes:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose
of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or
procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation,
security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office or authorized mail depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or
receives there from, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 1d.
~

.

See 42 U.S.C.S. § 408 (1999). "Penalties" provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In General. Whoever - (7) for the purpose of causing an increase
in any payment authorized under this title [42 USCS §§ 401 et seq.J (or
any other program financed in whole or in part from Federal funds), or
for the purpose of causing a payment under this title [42 USCS §§ 401
et seq.J (or any such other program (to be made when no payment is
authorized thereunder, or for the purpose of obtaining (for himself or
any other person) any payment or any benefit to which he (or such
other person), is not entitled, or for the purpose of obtaining anything
of value from any person, or for any other purpose - (B) with intent to
deceive, falsely represents a number to be the social security account
number assigned by the Commissioner of Social Security to him or to
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The district court appointed a federal public defender to
14
represent Farhad. However, Farhad informed the court that
15
he intended to proceed pro se.
The district court held a
hearing to determine Farhad's competence to represent himself and questioned Farhad under oath regarding his decision
16
to go forward pro se. The district court informed Farhad of
the charges against him and the potential consequences if convicted. 17 Farhad replied that he understood the court's concern
but reiterated his decision to proceed without counsel. 18 The
district court warned Farhad that he was "making things
harder" for himself by electing to proceed pro se. 19 The district
court also informed Farhad that he would not have the assistance of standby counsel,20 the use of an investigator, or access
to a law library.21 Despite these warnings from the court,

another person, when in fact such number is not the social security account number assigned by the Commissioner of Social Security to him
or to such other person. [d.

14

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Under the Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant is always required to have counsel. If
the defendant is indigent, the state is required to provide a public defender. See id.

15 See Farhad,

190 F.3d at 1098. "Pro se" is Latin for "for himself." In a legal context, pro se representation is one in which an individual represents himself without
the aid of counsel. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990).
16

Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098. Responding to the court's questions regarding
Farhad's understanding of the proceedings and why he wanted to represent himself,
Farhad stated he believed he could put forth a "more effective defense" than a public
defender. [d.

17

See id. The court warned Farhad that each of the nineteen counts had a "maximum penalty of five years in prison," which could run consecutively and "result in a
very long time." The court also explained that each count exposed him to a $250,000
fine, three years supervised release, a $50 special assessment fee; and a restitution
order. Rep. Tr. at 8-9.

18

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099.

19 [d. at 1098. The court informed Farhad that he would be responsible for arguing
motions, making objections, and abiding by the rules of evidence and procedure. The
court stated Farhad would "not get any breaks from the Court," again informing him
that he had the right to attorney representation. See id.

See id. at 1099. The term "standby counsel" refers to a public defender appointed
to a pro se defendant acting in an advisory role. There are varying levels of assistance
standby counsel may provide. See John H. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for
Pro Se Defendants: Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 697,
713 (1984).
20
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Farhad indicated that he still wished to proceed pro se, insisting on his "absolute right" to act as his own attorney.22
Despite the court's warning that he was not entitled to
standby counsel, the district court appointed an assistant pub23
lic defender to assist Farhad. Farhad informed the court that
he wanted to make his own opening and closing statements as
well as exercise challenges during jury selection. 24 Farhad requested that standby counsel perform all other duties. 25 The
district court rejected Farhad's proposition, stating that "it
cannot be done that way. You do it all or he does it a11. n26
Farhad withdrew his request for "hybrid representationn27 and
the district court held that Farhad had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and permitted him to proceed
pro se. 28 Nevertheless, during pre-trial preparations, the district court asked Farhad on several occasions whether he

21

Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. The court also informed Farhad that if he proceeded
pro 8e, he would lose a right to appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counselor because he "got a bad trial." [d.
22 [d.
23

•

See id.
24 See id.

25

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. Farhad sought to have standby counsel to crossexamine witnesses, make objections, and make motions to the court. See id.

.

~

[d. The court, in its discretion, may deny "hybrid counsel" pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (holding that a trial
judge is not required to permit "hybrid" representation).
27

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. Hybrid representation or co-counsel has been defined as the "most extreme form of advisory counsel" where both defendant and counsel participate in jury selection, statements, and questioning. See Pearson, supra note
20, at 713.
28

Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099.
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wanted counsel. 29 In response to the court's inquiries, Farhad
reaffirmed his commitment to represent himself. 30
Farhad performed miserably at trial. 31 With no understanding of the rules of evidence, Farhad repeatedly thwarted
his case by providing admissions and failing to protect his interests. 32 Farhad's inability to properly represent himself was
further apparent during cross examination. 33 While crossexamining a government witness, Farhad argued with the witness about his testimony.34 Further, Farhad failed to object to
damaging testimony.35 Accordingly, the court attempted to
29 See id.

On one occasion, when the court refused Farhad's request for an investigator to help him locate witnesses, the court said, "You've chosen to represent yourself. Now if [the public defender] were representing you in this case, then he has a
number of resources available to him ... That's why you're really hurting your chances
in this case by doing this. You can reconsider, by the way, if you want to change your
mind, and get [the public defender] to represent you." [d.

30 See id.

31 See id. at 1102.
32

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. Prior to Farhad deciding to proceed pro se, the
federal public defender had obtained an order restricting the introduction of evidence
of Farhad's prior conviction and current incarceration. During opening statements,
Farhad informed the jury, "I am a prisoner myself, you know?" He also stated, "I
might have done these things, but you know, it's not very certain, you know, that for
sure I have done this ... I'm not saying that no checks have been coming to my house.
It might have been." Farhad also admitted, "[I] had some tax forms in my cell." He
concluded his opening statement by informing the jury that "it doesn't matter what
you think, you know?" [d. at 1102-1103.

33 See id. at 1103.
34

35

See id.

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1103. One damaging colloquy involved the crossexamination of the correctional officer who searched his cell and discovered the tax
forms:
Q: Is that possible, that the boxes, you know, that has my name - it was written by
another
inmate?
A: No, it was not.
Q: How can that be?
A: Because your cell mate's box was on one end of the bed, and you made sure your
box was on
the other end. You did not have anything but a box of tax forms. And Kashani,
if you want
to get into it, you're a loner, you have all your stuff to yourself. Nobody even
knew much
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persuade Farhad to allow standby counsel to take his direct
testimony but Farhad again refused and insisted on proceeding
alone. 36 Farhad's effort to take direct testimony consisted of
37
Additionally,
asking and answering questions to himself.
Farhad asked himself argumentative and leading questions
which misstated the law. 38 Farhad faced similar problems
when providing evidence to the jury.39 For example, when
Farhad submitted a handwriting exemplar to the jury, the
court had to instruct the jury to disregard it because it stated:
"Farhad is an innocent man.,,40
Furthermore, Farhad failed to understand the
proceedings. 41 He confused the roles played by various people
in the courtroom. 42 For example, Farhad repeatedly referred to
the prosecution witness as the defendant. 43 Additionally,
Farhad did not know the meaning of the word "stipulation" or
understand its significance when informed of the implication of
entering into a stipulation regarding his fingerprints and
handwriting. 44 At the close of the prosecution's case, Farhad

about you. You don't even talk to people at the prison.
Farhad neither objected to this testimony nor asked that it be stricken. He never objected that the government's failure to lay any foundation for the testimony that the
bunk searched was Farhad's, but instead admitted that the tax forms were his, and
that he was reading them "like a magazine or book." [d.
36
S ee id.

37

.

See id. In the course of his testimony, Farhad referred to himself interchangeably as "you," "me," "Mr. Farhad," "Farhad Kashani," and "Kashani Farhad." [d.

38

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102-1103. One of his first questions was: "Mr. Farhad,
did San Quentin authority throw you in the hole based on a phone call that a depart. ment of revenue made to them?" The district court sustained an objection to this .
question, as well as to 19 of Farhad's 51 other questions. [d.

39 See id.
40 [d. at 1104.

41

See id. at 1103.

43

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1104.
See id.

42
44

See id. A stipulation is an agreement, admission, or concession made by parties
in a judicial proceeding. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1451 (6th ed. 1990). When the
stipulated evidence was presented during trial, Farhad asked the court to "take that
stipulation away." See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1104.
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asked the court to have standby counsel sit away from him because he believed that the lawyer was laughing and making
45
faces at him.
Farhad's closing argument consisted of declarations that he
should be found "100 percent not guilty" because "there was no
videotape. There was no camera. There was no pictures ... There was no DNA.,,46 Farhad also asked the jury to
return a "true verdict, a just verdict, that the prosecution has
proved its allegation.'047 The jury found Farhad guilty on all 19
48
counts. The court sentenced Farhad to 27 months in prison
49
and ordered him to pay $19,095.70 in restitution.
Farhad
filed four pro se notices of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 50
III. BACKGROUND
A. ESTABLISHING A PROCEDURAL MINIMUM STANDARD TO
WAIVE COUNSEL

In 1976, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
right to self-representation in Faretta u. California,51 finding
implicit in the Sixth Amendment a right to self-representation
52
in criminal cases.
The defendant, Anthony Faretta, was

45

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1104. The judge ordered Farhad's stand by counsel to
sit in the back of the courtroom, ending contact between standby counsel and defendant. See id.
46

d

J, •

47

[d. at 1097. Farhad was convicted on 14 counts of mail fraud and 5 counts of the
false use of social security numbers. See id.
48

49
50

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105.
See id. at 1098.
.

•

See Id. at 1105. Farhad claimed on four separate appeals that he had not knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally waived his right to counsel. Additionally, he
argued that the right to self-representation should be reconsidered. See id.
51 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
52

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. The Court in Faretta reasoned that because the
Sixth Amendment discusses counsel for criminal defendants as "assistance of counsel,"
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charged with grand theft and requested permission from the
. Superior Court of Los Angeles County to proceed pro se. 53 The
superior court questioned Faretta to determine his under54
standing of the proceedings. Based on Faretta's responses,
the court issued a preliminary ruling accepting Faretta's
waiver of the assistance of counsel. 55 Soon after granting
Faretta's request to represent himself, the superior court, on
its own initiative, held a hearing to determine Faretta's competence to represent himself. 56 Faretta's answers led the court to
believe that he did not understand what self-representation
entailed. 57 Therefore, the superior court concluded Faretta had
not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. 58 The
court then reversed its earlier ruling that allowed Faretta to
proceed pro se and appointed a public defender to represent
him. 59 Faretta was convicted at trial and appealed on the
ground that denial of his request to represent himself violated
his Constitutional right to waive counsel. 60 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari61 and reversed. 62

it nece88arily implies a right to waive that assistance. The Court also analyzed AngloAmerican legal traditions of self-representation as implying the right to selfrepresentation. See id.
53

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in
an information filed in Los Angeles County. See id.
54

See id. at 808. Faretta indicated that he had represented himself before, that he
was a high school graduate, and that he wished to represent himself because he believed the public defender was too busy to effectively represent him. See id.
55

See id. Prior to Faretta, courts routinely questioned defendants wishing to proceed pro se in an effort to determine the extent of their legal knowledge and to warn
them of the equal treatment they would receive. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808.
56

.

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808. Under the then-applicable California Supreme
Court case People v. Sharp, 499 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1972), the judge inquired into Faretta's
ability to conduct his own defense and questioned him specifically about the hearsay
rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. See id.
57
58
59

See id.
See id. at 809-810.
See id. at 810.

60

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811. Faretta claimed the trial court denied his Sixth
Amendment right to waive counsel. See id.
61

.

See id. at 812,. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent
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The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has the
right to proceed without counsel when the decision to do so is
made voluntarily and intelligently.63 The Court concluded that
although a pro se defendant may "conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.,,64
Further, the Court acknowledged that, historically, selfrepresentation was traditionally permitted in· the AngloAmerican legal system. 65
In Faretta, the Supreme Court laid the groundrules for all
future criminal defendants who decide to proceed pro se. So
long as a defendant can show that he has intelligently, voluntarily, and unequivocally waived his right to counsel, he is free
to proceed pro se. 66 However, the decision to represent oneself
has its share of problems, some of which. were discussed by

himself based on a then-recent California Supreme Court decision, People v. Sharp,
499 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1972). Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed Faretta's conviction. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion, and the California Supreme
Court denied review. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. See id.
62

See id. at 836.

63 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. The Supreme Court explained that the Sixth
amendment does not expressly grant the right to self-representation, but that it is
necessarily "implied" by the amendment's structure. This implied right, the Court
explained, is derived from the language of the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." The Court reasoned that to force counsel upon a defendant
would violate the logic of the Sixth Amendment because the Amendment refers to the
"assistance" of counsel, which implied that the role of the attorney is subordinate to
that of the client. Thus, where counsel is forced upon an unwilling defendant, the
attorney becomes the "master" and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists. See id. at 808.
64

ld. at 834. The Court reasoned that because it is the defendant who suffers the
consequences if the defense fails, the determination of how to proceed and with whom
lies with the defendant. ld.
65

See id. at 821-832. Analyzing the history of self-representation, the Court looked
as far back as 16th and 17th century England, the colonial underpinnings of the Sixth
Amendment, and §35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that "parties may
plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of ... counsel." See
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821-832.
66

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832.
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four justices dissenting from the majority Faretta opinion. 67
Justice Blackmun, in a separately written dissent cautioned
that the procedural ramifications of Faretta would "haunt the
trial of every defendant who elects to exercise his right to selfrepresentation. ,,68

B.

DEFINING THE COURT'S DUTIES

After Faretta, courts were faced with the task of interpreting, refining and developing feasible procedural mechanisms to
implement the right to self-representation. In Faretta, the Supreme Court established a standard procedure which all lower
courts must follow. Additionally, courts have developed numerous sub-issues of the right to self-representation to meet
concerns not foreseen when Faretta was decided.
In Godinez v. Moran,69 the Supreme Court established the
inquiry required to allow a defendant to proceed pro se. 70 The
Court held that trial courts must follow a four-part inquiry to
establish a valid waiver of counsel. 71 The four parts are: 1) the
accused must understand the nature of the charges against
67

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836-845 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Three of the four dissenting justices, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist, insisted that no independent constitutional basis supports the right to selfrepresentation. See id. at 844. They argued that no such right is "tucked between the
lines of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 837. Rather, they argued, the Sixth Amendment expressly omitted the right to self-representation, implying the right's exclusion
by the framers. See id. at 844. Further, Chief Justice Burger contended that the
majority decision would add congestion in the courts and the quality of justice would
suffer, leading to waning public confidence in a judicial system that allowed obtaining
easy convictions against lay defendants. See id. at 839-845.
68

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's concerns
included whether every defendant must be advised of the right to self-representation,
how waiver should be measured, whether their existed a right to standby counsel,
whether a defendant may switch mid-trial, how soon in the proceeding must a defendant decide to proceed pro se, whether a violation of the right to self-representation
could ever constitute harmless error, and how a court is to treat a pro se defendant.
See id.
69 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
70

See id.

71 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 390 (1993) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. 806
(1975».
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him; 2) the accused must be able to assist in his defense; 3) the
accused must know the consequences of entering a guilty plea;
and 4) the accused must be able to waive the right of counsel
knowingly and intelligently.72 In Godinez, a defendant charged
with murder waived his right to counsel and proceeded pro
se. 73 After conviction at trial, he appealed, contending he was
incompetent to waive his right to counsel because he was not
competent to conduct his own defense. 74 The Court, relying on
Faretta, held that a defendant need not have legal training or
an understanding of the rules of court or evidence to proceed
pro se. 76 Rather, the Court requires only that a defendant
make a knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal waiver under
76
Faretta. Therefore, the Court determined that for a defendant to proceed pro se, the competency standard required to
waive the right to counsel is the minimum required to stand
. 177
t na.
The Ninth Circuit further defined how Faretta should be
applied by determining the competency level required to waive
counsel. In United States v. Arlt,78 the Ninth Circuit held that
the trial court could not assess a defendant's capacity to formulate a petition when determining defendant's request to
proceed pro se. 79 Citing Godinez, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that a defendant's competency to proceed pro se must be de-

72
See id. at 392.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 393.
76
See id. at 394.

76 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 393-394. Applying this standard, the Court held that
the defendant had competently waived his right to counsel and upheld his conviction.
See id.

77 See id.

at 399. The Court explained that there is no reason to believe that the
decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning
than the decision to waive other constitutional rights because the competence required
to waive counsel is the competence to waive the right; not the competence to represent
himself. The Court held this standard is the "rational understanding standard." [d.
78

41 F. 3d. 516 (9th Cir. 1994).

79 See id. at 518.

The petition is described as "a rambling and illogical petition with
without legal basis or merit." [d.
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termined by his competency to stand trial, not by the defendant's ability to represent himself.80 The Ninth Circuit, citing
Godinez, held that the defendant was competent to waive
counsel because he was competent to stand trial. 81
Since Faretta, the Ninth Circuit has consistently followed
the guidelines set forth in Faretta to establish an intelligent
and knowing waiver of the right to counsel. For example, in
United States v. Van Krieken,82 the Ninth Circuit held that the
defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver under
Faretta, finding that his choice was made "with his eyes
open."s3 The Van Krieken court followed Faretta by requiring
that a waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.84 The
court determined that the defendant on numerous occasions
sought to waive counsel and each time was apprised of dangers
85
and consequences of proceeding pro se. Therefore, the court
concluded that Van Krieken had made a valid waiver of his
right to counsel. 86
The Ninth Circuit has maintained similarly strict applications of Faretta to determine if waivers of counsel are effective.
In United States v. Balough,87 the Ninth Circuit relied on
Faretta by requiring a defendant to be apprised of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation before being allowed
8S
to proceed pro se. In Balough, the trial court never warned
the defendant that he would be at a disadvantage by proceed-

80 See Id.
. at 518.
81
See id.

82

United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d. 227 (9th Cir. 1994).

83 ld. at 229 (cItmg
.. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820).
84

.

See id. See also Faretta, 422 U.S. 806.

85 See Van Kr&eken,
.

.

39 F.3d at 229. For example, the court appnsed the defendant
of his right to an attorney and stated that one would be appointed if he could not afford one. The court also explained each charge and the possible penalties. ld.
86
S ee id. at 231.
87

88

820 F. 2d. 1485 (9th Cir. 1987)
See id. at 1488.
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ing pro se. S9 Further, the trial court failed to warn how an attorney would be able to assist him in overcoming those disad90
vantages. Consequently, the court held that Balough had not
91
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
The Ninth Circuit has also invalidated waivers under
Faretta because lower courts failed to determine whether the
waiver was knowing & intelligent. For example, in United
States v. Mohawk,92 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant
did not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel
because the trial court failed to apprise the defendant of the
nature of the charges and possible penalties. 93 The Ninth Circuit held that the state failed to prove an intelligent and
knowing waiver because the state failed to provide a record of
the defendant engaging in a colloquy with the court in which
he was "informed" of the charges against him and the possible
penalties related to those charges,94
The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the Faretta
standard in determining issues related to the right to counsel. 95
However, once a court determines that a defendant has competently waived counsel and allows the defendant to proceed pro

S9

90
91

92
93

94

See id. at 1489.
See id.
See id. at 1490. See also United States v. Keen, 96 F. 3d. 425 (9th Cir. 1996).
20 F.3d. 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1483.

See id. Relying on the Faretta holding that the state bears the burden of showing
the validity of the defendant's waiver of trial counsel, the court concluded that the
state had failed to meet it's burden by not being able to produce a record of the defendant's colloquy with the lower court. See id.

95

See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balough,
820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994);
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Savage v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720
(9th Cir. 1982).
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se, issues such as standby counsel and access to legal materials
affect the defendant's right to a fair tria1. 96
C. STANDBY COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO SELFREPRESENTATION

The Faretta Court recognized the value of standby counsel
in protecting the interests of the pro se criminal defendant. 97
The Court stated that a trial court may appoint standby counsel to assist a pro se defendant in the presentation of his defense if the court finds that it is necessary.98 Additionally,
Chief Justice Burger in his dissent stated, "some of the damage
we can anticipate from a defendant's ill-advised insistence in
conducting his own defense may be mitigated by appointing a
qualified lawyer to sit in the case as the traditional 'friend of
the court.',,99
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,lOO Chief Justice Burger, in a
concurring opinion, cited several reasons that a trial judge
would be "well-advised" to appoint standby counsel when a de-

96

See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 523-535 (1996).

97
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852.
98

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-835 n.46. The Court stated, "Of course, a State may even over the objection by the accused - appoint a "standby counsel" to aid the accused
if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in
the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary." [d.
The Court assigned standby counsel the functions of assisting the defendant if requested and, at the extreme, rescuing an accused in the event that termination of her
self-defense is necessary. See id. Counsel can even be appointed over the defendant's
objection. See id. All of these possibilities reside however, in the judicial basement of
a footnote. This leaves the appointment of standby counsel as apparently nothing
more than something the court is free to offer to criminal defendants should the judge
see fit. See John H. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se Defendants:
Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 697, 713 (1984).

99

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 846 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger makes this
suggestion in light of the impact Faretta may have on judicial efficiency and efficacy.
He notes, "the newfound right to self-representation would create "added congestion
in the courts and the quality of justice would suffer." [d. at 846.
100

400 U.S. 455 (1971).
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fendant seeks to represent himself. 101 For example, standby
counsel may assist the defendant in the event he is removed
from the courtroom for disruptive behavior. 102
Further,
standby counsel may intervene when the defendant realizes he
lacks an appreciation of the consequences of his waiver and is
l03
unable to continue to represent his interest.
Ultimately,
Chief Justice Burger stated that no limitations existed, constitutional or otherwise, on a trial judge's absolute discretion to
appoint standby counsel. 104
In McKaskle v. Wiggins,105 the United States Supreme
Court directly addressed the issue of standby counsel's effect
on the right to self-representation. l06 In McKaskle, the pro se
defendant claimed that standby counsel interfered with his
right to self-representation. l07 The Court held that standby
counsel's participation did not impair the defendant's Faretta
rights. lOB Rather, the Court held that standby counsel may be
appointed at the discretion of the inquiring tribunal so long as

101 Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 468 (Burger, C.J., concurring). He also noted that if
standby counsel were appointed, the defendant may consult with counsel, resolve his
questions, and then continue to adequately represent himself. He concluded that the
presence of standby counsel relaxes the duty on the part of the trial judge who maintains an extra burden during trials where a defendant is exercising his Faretta rights.
See id.
102 See id. at 468.
103

.

See ,d.

104

See id. He wrote, "[i]n every trial there is more at stake than just the interests
of the accused; the integrity of the process warrants a trial judge's exercising his discretion to have counsel participate in the defense even when rejected... The value of the
precaution of having independent counsel, even if unwanted, is underscored by situations where the accused is removed from the courtroom." See Mayberry, 400 U.S. at
465.
105 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
106

See id. at 173.

107 See id. The defendant claimed that his right to self-representation was compromised by standby counsel repeatedly interjecting during defendant's defense and arguing with the defendant over his defense. See id. at 174.
lOB See id. at 175. The Court reasoned that standby counsel might provide the pro
se litigant with needed assistance since the pro se status of a criminal defendant does
not excuse the defendant from normal procedural rules. See McKaskle, 475 U.S. at
184.
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standby counsel allows the defendant actual control over the
case and does not destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.l09 Finally, the Court determined
that standby counsel may assist a pro se defendant in overcoming procedural and evidentiary obstacles without interferuO
ing with McKaskle's Faretta rights.
The Ninth Circuit has also discussed standby counsel's role
in the pro se defense. In United States v. Robinson, III the
Ninth Circuit addressed the defendant's use of standby counsel
and the pro se defendant's access to materials in preparation
for trial. U2 In Robinson, the defendant decided to proceed pro.
se and in response, the district court appointed standby counsel prior to trial. U3 Robinson wa's convicted at trial and on appeal, argued that his right to self-representation had been
compromised because standby counsel had failed to assist in
providing an adequate defense. U4 The Ninth Circuit held that
conflicts with standby counsel do not abrogate the defendant's
right to self-representation because the Sixth Amendment does
not compel counsel to blindly follow defendant's instruction. us
The court concluded that Robinson had made a valid waiver of

109

See McKaskle, 475 U.S. at 178. The Court noted that standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection, allowing counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses,
or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, would erode defendant's Faretta right. See id.
110

See id. at 183. Obstacles include introducing evidence or objecting to testimony,
which the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to complete. Counsel may also assist
to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure. See id.
111

913 F. 2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990).
U2See id.

113

See id. at 715.

S'd
ee, . at 716. Robinson h ad numerous tactical disagreements with appointed
standby counsel and felt the court's refusal to take this into consideration violated his
right to self-representation. See id.
U4

115

See Robinson, 913 F.2d at 715-716.
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the right to counsel and that his dissatisfaction with appointed
standby counsel could not constitute reversible error. U6
Additionally, Robinson argued that he was forced to accept
standby counsel as the only alternative to having limited access to legal materials.117 Specifically, the court noted that requiring a defendant to choose between appointed counsel and
access to legal materials does not violate the Sixth Amendment. 118 The court determined that limited access to legal materials for pro se defendants was constitutional because the
limitation conforms to perceived needs of prison
management. 119 In this context, the court held that a defendant may be made to choose between appointed counsel and
access to legal materials because the Sixth Amendment is satisfied by the offer of professional representation alone. 120 So
long as an alternative to standby counsel does not offend the
Constitution, it will be upheld. 121
The Ninth Circuit further defined the role of standby counsel by increasing the level of standby counsel's participation.
In United States v. Kimmel,122 the Ninth Circuit held that the
123
district court may allow a hybrid form of representation.
Hybrid representation allows the accused to assume some of
the attorney's functions, so long as the accused makes a valid

116

See id.

117

See id. at 717. Robinson's limited access to legal materials consisted of the district court's decision to allow Robinson only one box of legal materials. Prior to the
order, Robinson had accumulated six boxes oflegal materials. See id.
118

See id. at 717-718.

119 See Robinson, 913 F.2d at 718. The court alluded to security considerations and
the limitations of the penal system as reasons for limiting defendant's access to legal
materials. Furthermore, the court noted the defendant was offered opportunities to
transfer to another jail and conduct more expansive research there; something defendant turned down because he felt the offered facility was "too crowded." [d.

120
121
122
123

See id. at 717.
See id.
672 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981).
S ee id.
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waiver.124 In Kimmel, a defendant charged with a drug-related
offense elected to proceed pro se and the court appointed
standby counsel to assist in his defense. 125 Although standby
counsel actively argued before the jury and acted as the dominant spokesperson for the defense, the court noted that counsel
did not assume all the duties of retained or appointed
counsel. 126 In this context, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
"hybrid' form of standby counsel is constitutional, so long as
the defendant's waiver of counsel comports with the Faretta
.
t s. 127
reqwremen
However, the Ninth Circuit has also limited a defendant's
right to proceed pro se. In Savage v. Estelle,128 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant with a severe speech impediment
could not exercise the right of self-representation because he
was unable to communicate to the jury.129 In Savage, a defen130
dant charged with assault elected to proceed pro se. After a
Faretta hearing, the district court granted the defendant's request to proceed pro se. 131 However, standby counsel was appointed to assist the defendant in presenting his case to the
jury because of the defendant's severe speech impediment. 132
The Ninth Circuit relied on McKaskle 133 where they earlier denied the defendant the opportunity to proceed pro se because
he was unable to abide by courtroom procedure. 134 Citing
McKaskle, the Ninth Circuit held that allowing standby coun-

124

•

See Klmmel, 672 F. 2d at 72l.

125
See id.
126
See id.
127 See id.
128 908 F. 2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990).
129
See id. at 509.
130 See id. The defendant decided to proceed pro se during pre·trial motions.
id.

See

131 See id.
132

See Sauage, 908 F.2d at 509.

133 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
134 See id. at 173.
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sel to handle the core functions of the defense did not violate
defendant's right to self-representation when the defendant is
unable to competently present his case to the jury.136

Faretta and its progeny established a procedural minimum
standard, implied under the Sixth Amendment, which must be
met before a criminal defendant will be allowed to represent
himself. 136 This standard requires a trial court to engage in a
colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the defendant is
literate, competent, understanding, that he or she knowingly
and voluntarily intends to waive his or her Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, and that the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 137 Once these
facts are established, the court may grant the waiver and allow
138
the defendant to proceed pro se.
The defendant is expected,
however, to present a defense conforming to the court and evidentiary rules. 139 Furthermore, a defendant is barred from
raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for
appeal when he conducts a pro se defense or is assisted by
standby counsel in that capacity. 140 Thus, the need for the informed and effective exercise of the right to self-representation
is crucial. In this regard, standby counsel has become an im141
portant aspect of the right to self-representation.

136
See Savage, 908 F.2d at 515.
136

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.

U7

.

See Frederic Paul Gallun, The Sixth Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments
on the Right to Waive Counsel Under Faretta, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CN.
CONFINEMENT 559, 563 (1997).

138 See Id.
.
139
See id.
140

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-835 n. 46. The Court explained, "The right to selfrepresentation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus,
whatever mayor may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted
to a denial of 'effective assistance of counsel'" [d.

141

See Decker, supra note 96, at 523-524.
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D.

CURRENT CASE LAW: MARTINEZ V. COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA

Despite Faretta's influence in the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence of the past twenty years, a recent case reveals the
United States Supreme Court's divergence from key aspects of
Faretta's analysis. In Martinez v. California Court of Appeal, 142
the Court addressed the right to self-representation in appellate proceedings. 143 Defendant, a paralegal, was charged with
144
Martinez
grand theft and embezzlement of client funds.
145
He was subsequently convicted
elected to proceed pro se.
and filed a timely notice of appeal along with a motion for selfrepresentation to the California Court of Appeal. 146 The court
denied his motion, holding that denial of self-representation at
the appellate level does not violate due process or equal protec· guarant ees. 147
t Ion
The Supreme Court affirmed California's decision, stating
three reasons why Faretta was inapplicable. 148 First, the Court
reasoned that Faretta relied on outmoded information. 149 Specifically, the Martinez Court stated that the historical right to
self-representation "pertained to times when lawyers were
scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily available to the average person accused of crime. "150 Second, the Court found
Faretta's reliance on the Sixth Amendment's structure and history inapplicable because the Amendment did not contemplate
the right to counsel in appellate proceedings. 161 Third, the
Court reasoned that the right to waive counsel is not
142
143
144
146
146
147
148
149
150
161

120 S.Ct. 684 (2000).

See id.
See id. at 686.
See id. at 687.
See id.
See Martinez, 120 S.Ct. at 687.
See id. at 686.
See id.
[d. at 688.

See id. at 690.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 8

150 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1
152
absolute.
Rather, the Court noted that the risk of disloyalty
by a court-appointed attorney, or the suspicion of such disloyalty, that underlies the right of self-representation at trial is
insufficient to warrant its necessity at the appellate level. 153
Martinez reflects a shift in the Court's application of
Faretta.
The Court recognized the failings of selfrepresentation, stating, "experience has taught us that 'a pro
se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense
attorney.,"154 Furthermore, the Court remarked in a footnote
that "even at the trial level, the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer."155
Nevertheless, Faretta is still valid law because the Court's deCISIon in Martinez only applies to appellate selfrepresentation. 156 Moreover, Martinez tacitly recognized the
right to self-representation at the trial level. 157
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

In United States v. Farhad,158 the Ninth Circuit confirmed
the right to self-representation by following Faretta's holding
that a knowing, intelligent and unequivocal waiver represents
a valid waiver of the right to counsel. 159 In determining
whether Farhad's waiver was valid, the court addressed the
"knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal" requirements with the
understanding that the burden of proving a waiver's legality

152
Martinez, 120 S.Ct. at 691.
153 See Id.
. at 690-691.
154 See id. at 691 (citing Decker, supra note 96, at 598).
155
Martinez, 120 S.Ct. at 691.

156

See id. at 692.

157 See id.
158

190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).

159 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100.
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rests with the state, "indulging every reasonable presumption
. tthe waIver.
.
"160
agams
A. KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER

Citing Faretta and Ninth Circuit precedent,161 the court restated the rule that a waiver of counsel is "knowing and intelligent" only if the defendant is aware of the nature of the
charges against him, the possible penalties, and the dangers
162
and disadvantages of self-representation.
Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the record must establish that
"[the defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with his eyes open. "163 The Ninth Circuit also noted that the
preferred procedure is for each component of the rule to be discussed separately in open court. 164
Analyzing the three "knowing and intelligent" factors, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the district court "conscientiously conducted the appropriate inquiry. "165 The district
court informed Farhad of the charges against him and of the
possible penalties each charge carried. 166 The district court

160

•

See ,d. at 1099-1100.

161 See Umted
. States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Crr.
.
.
1994); Umted States v. Balough,
820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994);
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Savage v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720
(9th Cir. 1982).

162
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099.
163 Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1009 (citing United States v.

Balough, 820 F.2d 1485 (9th

Cir.1987).
164 See id. The majority acknowl~dged that as soon as Farhad requested to proceed
pro se, the trial judge immediately held a hearing in open court to determine the validity of Farhad's waiver. See w.

165 Farhad,

190 F.3d at 1099.

166

See id. at 1098. The district court judge informed Farhad that he was charged
with 19 counts, informed him of the maximum penalty on each count, and pointed out
the potential consequences for him in state prison if he incurred a new federal conviction. See w.
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also discussed the disadvantages of self-representation. 167 Further, Farhad repeated his desire to provide his own defense,
despite the district court's numerous warnings that he was
"making it hard on himself. "168 Based on these facts, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Farhad had made a knowing and intel· t waIver.
.
169
1Igen
B. UNEQUIVOCAL WAIVER

In addition to the knowing and intelligent requirement, the
Ninth Circuit stated that a valid waiver must be
unequivocal. 170 In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit analogized
l7l
the facts in Farhad to those in Van Krieken. In Van Krieken,
the defendant made numerous requests to waive counsel despite warnings of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se. 172 The Ninth Circuit held that these numerous requests
173
Simiconstituted an unequivocal decision to proceed pro se.
larly in Farhad, the Ninth Circuit noted that Farhad's repeated requests to proceed pro se indicated his unequivocal
waiver of his right to counsel and not "mere whim or
•
"174
capnce.

167

See id. The majority found that the district court adequately warned Farhad by
informing him of the "core functions" of an attorney. The Ninth Circuit also noted that
the district court warned Farhad that he would be expected to perform those functions
at trial. The majority also determined that the district court warned Farhad that he
would be expected to ask questions, make arguments, and observe the rules of evidence and courtroom procedure. See id.
168
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098-1099. After the initial hearing, Farhad reaffirmed
his choice to proceed pro se on at least two separate occasions. First, when he was
denied standby counsel and second, when the court refused his request for an investigator. On both occasions, the court warned Farhad of the disadvantages of proceeding
pro se but Farhad maintained his position. See id.
169
170
171
172
173
174

See id. at 1100.
See id. (citing Van Krieken, 39 F.3d at 229 (9th Cir. 1994».
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100.
See Van Krieken, 39 F.3d at 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 230.
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100.
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C. THE MERITS OF FARE1TA

The Ninth Circuit denied Farhad's request to reconsider the
validity of the right to self-representation in criminal trials as
recognized in Faretta. 175 Relying on state and federal court
decisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Farhad's request
for an advisory opinion on Faretta would be an improper exercise of the court's discretion. 176
The Ninth Circuit also noted that courts have expanded the
Faretta right. 177 Specifically, the court discussed Godinez v.
Moran which extended the Faretta right to all criminal defendants, including those who are mentally impaired. 17s The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the "overwhelming weight" of
precedent .supported its refusal to review the Faretta
decision. 179
Concluding that the Faretta right to selfrepresentation is firmly established, the Ninth Circuit held
that Farhad had knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally
1so
waived his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

175

See id. at 1100-1101. On appeal, Farhad requested the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the validity of Faretta. See id.
176 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had published "dozens of opinions" applying Faretta, specifically citing cases discussed herein.
See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balough, 820
F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994);
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Savage v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720
(9th Cir. 1982).

177

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100.

17S See id. (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993». The Ninth Circuit held
that a defendant may waive his right to counsel so long as they are "competent to
stand trial." [d.
179
ISO

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101.
See id. at 1100.
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D. JunGE REINHARDT'S CONCURRING OPINION
Judge Reinhardt agreed with the majority that Farhad had
181
constitutionally waived his right to counsel. However, Judge
Reinhardt concluded that even if Farhad's waiver comported
182
with the United States Constitution, his trial did not. Judge
Reinhardt noted that though Faretta has been continually reaffirmed,l83 the Court has never addressed the Faretta dissenters' concerns "that a conviction in a proceeding so fundamentally flawed that, were it not for Faretta, would undoubtedly
offend minimum constitutional standards of fairness.,,184
1. The Right to a Fair Trial and the Sixth Amendment
The Constitution guarantees every defendant the fundamental, absolute right to a fair trial. Judge Reinhardt argued
that, unlike the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel and
the implied right to self-representation are not absolute
rights. 180 Rather, the right to counsel is like all other procedural guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, all of which must
yield to the substantive right. 186
87

Quoting the Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas/ Judge
Reinhardt noted, "the right to a fair trial is the most fundamental of all freedoms," essential to the preservation and en188
Judge Reinhardt further stated
joyment of all other rights.
that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment are best viewed as
"institutional safeguards for attaining the overarching objec181

See id. at 1101.

179

See id. at 1101-1102. Judge Reinhardt noted that Farhad's fundamentally
flawed performance at trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. Id.

183 See supra notes 51-157 and accompanymg
. text.
184 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, (Burger, C.J., dissenting».
18DSee,'d .
186 See id. Judge Reinhardt argued Sixth Amendment guarantees are a "means to
achieve the substantive objective of the fair trial." Id.

187
W8

381 U.S. 532 (1965).

,
••

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105 (cltmg Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965».
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tive of a fair trial."189 Judge Reinhardt argued that permitting
self-representation regardless of the consequences threatens to
"divert" criminal trials from their "clearly defined purpose" of
providing a "fair and reliable determination. "190
Judge Reinhardt also criticized the court's decision to carry
the Faretta holding to its illogical conclusion by holding that
any defendant, even one who is severely mentally impaired,
has the right to proceed pro se so long as he is minimally competent. 191 He also lamented the court's expansion of those eligible to be pro se defendants to include juveniles and illiterates. 192 This expansion of the Faretta right, Judge Reinhardt
concluded, is squarely opposed to the guarantee of a fair
. 1 193
t na.

2. Waiving the Right to a Fair Trial
Judge Reinhardt addressed the issue of whether a defendant may waive his right to a fair trial. 194 He concluded that
he may not, reasoning that the government has a compelling
interest, related to its own legitimacy, in ensuring both fair
procedures and reliable outcomes in criminal trials, both of
which are thwarted when an incapable or incompetent defendant proceeds pro se. 195 Conversely, Judge Reinhardt pointed
to the justification for allowing a defendant to waive his right
to counsel under Faretta because "it is he who suffers the consequences if his defense fails."196 However, Judge Reinhardt
concluded that waving the right to a fair trial creates a larger
189
Farhad,
190 ••d.
191

190 F.3d at 1106 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965».

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1106 (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 389).

192 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1107 (citing Peters v. Gunn, 33 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir.
1994»; See also Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989).

193
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105-1106.
194
See id. at 1108.
195
See id.
196

Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1107 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975».

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 8

156 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1

problem because the right to a fair trial implicates not only the
interests of the individual defendant, but the "institutional
197
interests" of the judicial system. He stated that "not only the
defendant 'suffers the consequences' when a fair trial is denied,
but the justice system itself. "198
Judge Reinhardt then discussed the issue of whether the
Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial may be implicitly waived
as it was in Farhad. 199 Judge Reinhardt concluded that it may
not be. Citing Brewer v. Williams,200 he noted that waivers of
constitutional rights are disfavored, and that courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against them. 201 Thus, he concluded, when waiving a right as important as the right to a fair
trial, "waiver by implication would appear highly inappropria t e.
~02

3. Procedural Concerns
Judge Reinhardt pointed out that a strict Faretta inquiry
creates a judiciary "with eyes wide shut. ~03 He concluded that
after the pre-trial stages in which the Faretta inquiry occurs,
204
the constitutionality of the trial is rendered irrelevant.
Furthermore, he noted that an inquiry into the constitutionality of
a hearing is determined by reviewing the entire proceeding,
including the trial itself to determine whether it comports with
constitutional standards of fairness. 205 Judge Reinhardt concluded that Farhad is a prime example of the judiciary "avert-

198

See id. at 1107.
[d.

199

See id. at 1108.

200

430 U.S. 387 (1977).

201
202

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1108 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977».

197

[d. at 1108.

203 See id. at 1102.
204

See id.

205

See id. at 1105. See also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (holding
that judicial review of due process requires an exercise of judgment upon an entire
course of a proceeding to determine whether a violation has occurred).
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ing its gaze" from Farhad's pitiful attempt to, in his own
words, "make a more glorious kind of a defense. ,,206
Lastly, Judge Reinhardt discussed the need for balancing
the right to self-representation and the right to a fair trial. 207
He pointed out that both require consideration as constitu208
tional rights in the criminal justice system.
He continued,
"as with most other individual rights, there are competing and
countervailing interests, both personal and social. ,,209 Judge
Reinhardt concluded by requesting the courts to "develop rules
for determining when the exercise of the right to selfrepresentation would be consistent with the mandate of the
Fifth Amendment [right to a fair trial], and when it would
not.,,210 In conclusion, he noted that the adoption of a rule to
delineate the coexistence of seemingly competing rights must
be determined by the Supreme Court, not by lower courts.2l1

V. CRITIQUE
Relying on the Supreme Court holding in Faretta and subsequent case history, the Ninth Circuit's majority in Farhad
concluded that the defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and
unequivocally waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 212
However, the Ninth Circuit's decision failed to address key
procedural and substantive concerns related to the right of
self-representation. 213
Those concerns, raised by Justice
Blackmun in Faretta and again by Justice Reinhardt in
Farhad, relate to the potential denial of a fair trial in granting
206
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102.
207
.
See id. at 1108.
208
See id.

209 ld. Judge Reinhardt also wrote that the implied right to self-representation
"allows Farhad and others with similar limitations or incapacitates to turn criminal
trials into travesties." ld.

210
211

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1108.
See id. at 1108-1109.

212 See United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999).
213 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the defendant's right to proceed pro se. 214 In Farhad, the
Ninth Circuit conducted the Faretta analysis with no attempt
to address the fair trial concerns of the defendant or Justice
215
Reinhardt's concurring opinion.
The Ninth Circuit merely
addressed the validity of the waiver of the right to counsel in a
216
vacuum.
The Ninth Circuit's strict reading of Faretta inadequately
addressed the conflict between a defendant's right to autonomy
and society's interest in maintaining fairness in criminal
217
The importance of the right to a fair trial requires
trials.
that the court adopt procedures designed to minimize the potentially destructive effects of a defendant's waiver of counsel
for the individual defendant and the judicial system as a
218
whole.
In Farhad, the defendant's desire for autonomy in a
219
criminal trial outweighed the court's concern for a fair trial.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's analysis also failed to balance these interests appropriately.220
Though courts are bound by Farettaas Supreme Court
221
precedent, later cases from the Supreme Court and the
22
Ninth Circuie have discussed procedures and guidelines to

214 See id. See also Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. Justice Reinhardt's argues the Fifth
Amendment right to a fair trial supersedes the procedural rights of the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, he argues that the Fifth Amendment should not be compromised by
the right to self-representation when a pro se defendant (i.e., Farhad) conducts a defense that makes a mockery of the judicial system. See id.

215
216

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101.
See id. at 1098-1100.

217 See id. at 1108.

Agreeing with Judge Reinhardt's concurrence.

See John H. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se Defendants: Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 697, 713 (1984). Pearson argues for procedural mechanisms such as mandatory standby counsel to counteract the
detrimental effects of self-representation on a defendant's right to a fair trial. See id.
218

219
220

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101.
See id. at 1108.

221 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); McKaskle v, Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984).
222 See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balough,
820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994);
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assist the criminal defendant in presenting a pro se defense.
This case law indicates that though Farhad is bound by
Faretta as precedent, there is enough flexibility to consider
means of protecting both rights essential to a criminal trial:
the defendant's need for a fair trial and the importance of the
right to self-representation. 223
The Ninth Circuit in Farhad could have better resolved this
conflict by addressing two of Farhad's requests to the district
court: first, his request for "standbylhybrid" counsel, and second, his request for greater access to legal materials during the
224
district court proceedings.
Granting these two requests
would have enhanced Farhad's chances of receiving a fair trial
under the Fifth Amendment. At the same time, Faretta would
have been satisfied because Farhad could have maintained his
autonomy by controlling his own defense.
A. RECOGNIZING STANDBY COUNSEL'S ROLE

Following Faretta, the United States Supreme Court in
McKaskle v. Wiggini 25 recognized the constitutionality of
standby counsel in connection with the right to self226
representation.
The Court developed a two-part test to determine the constitutionality of standby counsel. 227 First, the
pro se defendant must preserve actual control over the case he

United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Savage v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720
(9th Cir. 1982).
223

•

•

•

For example, standby counsel has been a pnnclpal means of protectmg the pro
se defendant from the pitfalls of proceeding without counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 175 (1984).
224
225

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099.
465 U.S. 168 (1984).

226

See id. at 169. However, standby counsel is not a right; it is a privilege which is
left to the discretion of the trial judge. See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment
Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of SelfRepresentation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 525 (1996).
227

See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
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chooses to present to the jury.228 Second, standby counsel's actions should preserve the jury's perception that defendant is
229
conducting his own defense. Furthermore, the pro se defendant should be allowed to address the court freely on his own
behalf. 230 If disagreements between standby counsel and the
pro se defendant arise, they are resolved in the defendant's
favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left
to the discretion of counsel. 231 The McKaskle Court concluded
that unsolicited participation of standby counsel may provide a
defendant with needed assistance because pro se status does
not excuse a defendant from abiding by normal procedural
232
rul es.
Ultimately, the pro se defendant must be allowed to control
the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appro233
priate points in the tria1.
These rights, the Court explained,

228

[d.

229
[d. at 178.
230
See id. at 179.
231
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179.
232

See id. at 183-184. A commentator notes that standby counsel may enter objections or make other moves to further the defense, even against the defendant's will.
Counsel may also on her own take steps to aid the defendant in surmounting procedural hurdles, thereby freeing the judge from this task. The defendant, "does not have
a constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on constitutional procedure," nor is the judge constitutionally required "to take over chores for a
pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of
course. "" In setting limits to the pro se right, the court has identified those areas
where the efforts can be made to protect the essential fairness and adequacy of trials
as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments without violating the Faretta
right to self-defense. By expanding the limits within which standby counsel may constitutionally function, McKaskle increases the efficacy of such counsel in protecting a
defendant's right to a fair trial. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se
Defendants, 72 CAL. L. REV. at 704.

233

See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173-187. See also Frederic Paul Gallun, The Sixth
Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments on the Right to Waive Counsel Under
Faretta, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIY. CONFINEMENT 559 (1997).
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represent the crux of the
· 234
represent a t Ion.

161

defendant's right to self-

Courts have also expanded the role of standby counsel to
that of "hybrid counsel," in which both defendant and attorney
present the defense. 236 Though Faretta does not guarantee a
criminal defendant the constitutional right to hybrid representation, the Ninth Circuit has held otherwise. 236 In the Ninth
Circuit, trial courts may at their discretion, grant an accused's
request to assume some of the attorney's functions. 237 In
United States v. Kimmel,238 the Ninth Circuit held that "the
district court has the authority to allow a hybrid form of representation in which the accused assumes some of the lawyer's
functions. ~39 A hybrid form of standby counsel is a logical
remedy for the risks a pro se defense poses to a fair trial. 240
Standby counsel can significantly lessen the negative effects of
a pro se defense while maintaining the defendant's right to
self-representation.

234

See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173-187. The Court highlighted the following functions Wiggins performed during the course of the trial: 1) filing numerous pro se motions, 2) cross-examining the prosecutions witnesses, 3) registering objections, 4) selecting and examining witnesses, 5) deciding which questions would not be asked by
the defense, 6) determining when the defense would rest, 7) making objections to suggested jury charges as well as filing his own jury charges, and 8) giving a closing argument to the jury. The Court held that the defendant's Faretta rights were not violated because he had ample opportunity to control his own pre-trial and trial presentations and also, in light of the entire record, any unsolicited participation by standby
cOUDsel was reasonable. Id. at 174-175.
236

See United States v. Kimmel, 672 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir, 1982):

236 See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183. Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit
"hybrid" representation. See id.
. 237

See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New
Paths - A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9 (1986) (explaining that courts often reject
hybrid representation on the basis of "efficiency considerations as well as solicitude for
the attomey"). While. trial courts in all jurisdictions adhere to some fundamental
rules concerning hybrid representation, courts in most jurisdictions routinely deny
requests for any form of mixed representation.ld.
238
239
240

672 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 721.
See Pearson, supra note 218, at 713.
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However, hybrid counsel should not be limited to cases dependent on the court's exercise of discretion. Rather, hybrid
counsel should be mandatory in all cases where a criminal defendant elects to proceed pro se because most defendants do
not fully appreciate the risks involved in self-representation,
regardless of the Faretta inquiry.241 Furthermore, the benefits
of hybrid counsel far outweigh its disadvantages. For example,
hybrid counsel protects the lay defendant from procedural and
evidentiary pitfalls, many of which Farhad suffered. 242 The
only arguable disadvantage may be that the defendant's
autonomy is compromised. However, under McKaskle, the defendant controls the defense, ensuring his autonomy is protected on a certain level. 243 The defendant may utilize hybrid
counsel to the extent necessary to adequately represent his
case. In Farhad, the defendant requested this type of shared
representation and the district court denied his request, laying
the foundations for Farhad's failure at trial. 244
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE F ARHAO'S NEED
FOR HYBRID COUNSEL

The district court in Farhad appointed standby counsel. 245
However, Farhad requested a "hybrid form" of representation
which allowed him to make opening and closing statements
and exercise challenges during jury selection. 246 The district
court flatly rejected Farhad's request. 247 If the district court
had granted his request, Farhad would not have had the op-

241
See id. at 713-715.
242
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102-1104.
243
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
244
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099.
245
See id.
246
See id.

247 See id. The court responded: "It cannot be done that way. You do it all or [the
public defender] does it all." [d.
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portunity to make a mockery of the trial system with his ''more
glorious kind of defense n248
"Hybrid representation" in Farhad would have satisfied
Under
constitutional standards set forth in McKaskle.
McKaskle, the pro se defendant must retain actual control over
the defense 249 and standby counsel's actions cannot alter the
jury's perception that the defendant is conducting his own defense. 25o If these requirements are met, hybrid counsel would
be appropriate under Faretta.
Granting Farhad's request for hybrid counsel would not
have affected his actual control over the case. Specifically,
while Farhad wanted hybrid counsel to represent him
throughout the trial, he wanted to make his own opening and
51
closing statements himselC Because the opening statement
serves as an overview for the defense by outlining the defense's
arguments and detailing what types of evidence will be admitted, Farhad could have "set the course" of his defense with his
opening statement. Similarly, Farhad could have used the
closing argument as an opportunity to distill the defense's arguments and provide a summary of what the jury had seen.
The jury's perception of whether Farhad had conducted the
defense would not have been affected by appointing hybrid
standby counsel. Farhad stated he would conduct jury selec252
tion and present both opening and closing statements.
Allowing Farhad to select the jury would give potential jurors the
impression that he had control over his defense. Furthermore,
by presenting the opening and closing statements, Farhad
would appear to be in control of his own case. He would, in
effect, be the first person and last person the jury would en-

248

See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. Farhad, in response to the court's inquiry why he
wanted to proceed pro se, responded that he wanted to present a "more glorious kind
of defense." [d.
249
250
251
252

See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
S ee id .
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099.
See id.
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counter from the defendant's table. Thus, if Farhad shared
duties with hybrid standby counsel, it appears he would have
maintained actual control over the defense and provided the
jury with the impression that he had control over his defense.
C. THE 9TH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED FARHAD ACCESS
TO INVESTIGATIVE AND RESEARCH MATERIALS

Hybrid counsel for a pro se defendant would also alleviate
other problems characteristic of a pro se defense, such as the
pro se defendant's lack of access to legal materials. For example, in Farhad, a defendant who refuses the assistance of appointed counsel also lacks the unlimited access to a law library
or other legal materials that counsel would bring to the defense. 253 Standby counsel, however, could serve as a conduit
through which the pro se defendant may gain access to otherwise unobtainable materials. 254
Traditionally, courts have extended judicial assistance only
to pro se litigants who are prisoners. 255 Prisoners, these courts
claim, have problems that justify the burden placed on the adversary system by treating them in a lenient manner. 256 These
problems include limited legal access to legal materials and
sources of proof. 257 As prisoners, criminal defendants are limited by physical and monetary restrictions to building their
258
defenses. Farhad is a prime example of these limitations.

253
254

S ee id .
See Pear8on, supra note 218, at 718.

See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F. 2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Moore v. Florida, 703
F. 2d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1983).
255
256
257
258

See id.
See id.
S ee id.
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Farhad, as a prisoner, did not have access to witnesses or
legal research. 259 He was offered only limited use of library
materials. 260 Hybrid counsel would have alleviated this problem because the lawyer does not have these restrictions. Thus,
in an effort to alleviate the burdens associated with research
and investigation in preparation for his defense, Farhad's
rights as a defendant would have been better protected had
"hybrid counsel" been assigned to him.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Farhad is an unnecessarily
narrow reading of a defendant's right to proceed pro se under
Faretta. Such a strict following of Faretta compromises not
only the defendant's right to a fair trial, but society's interest
in a just criminal trial system. To alleviate this tension, mandatory hybrid counsel offers a means for meeting the interests
of all parties to the judicial process.
Courts must provide hybrid counsel in all criminal cases,
even over a defendant's objection. If a defendant were given
the option of waiving standby counsel, it would circumvent the
goal of protecting the unknowing pro se defendant rights. Cost
to the system may become an issue, but this concern is mitigated by the efficient administration of justice. Courts dealing
with defendants assisted by hybrid counsel would avoid the
hassles and delays normally associated with the pro se defense.
All participants in the criminal trial would benefit from a
defendant with mandatory hybrid counsel. Defendants, while
controlling their cases, would have access to the information
261
and .materials necessary for an effective defense.
Courts
would no longer be compelled to "care for" pro se defendants,

259 Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098-1099. Farhad's standby counsel at trial did not access
witnesses or conduct legal research for Farhad. It appears his role was limited to
solely assisting Farhad at trial. See id.
260
261

See id. at 1100.
See Pearson, supra note 218, at 719.
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and trials would not be hampered by a defendant's lack of
262
Prosecutors could act as fully effective
technical expertise.
adversaries, confident that the advised defendant is a· worthy
263
opponent.
Hybrid counsel ensures that the defendant complies with courtroom procedures and that courts follow due
process requirements. 264 Additionally, hybrid counsel would
assist the court in appropriately and efficiently hearing the
case. Finally and most importantly, society would benefit from
a criminal justice system that, in accordance with the Fifth
Amendment, guarantees a fair trial to every defendant.
Kenneth S. Sogabe·

262

263
264

d
t.

See id.
See id.
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